Azure Sentinel – Detecting brute force RDP attempts
Posted by Ashish Gupta in Azure, Security on June 5, 2019
Azure Sentinel is a cloud based SIEM* and SOAR** solution.
As it’s still in preview, I wanted to test out few of Its capabilities.
In this post we will see how we can detect RDP brute-force attempts and respond using automated playbooks in Azure Sentinel.
[*SIEM : Security Incident Event Management]
[**SOAR : Security Orchestration Automated Response]
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/overview
The infrastructure:
I have couple of virtual machines in Azure which have RDP opened (sure, I am the first one to keep that opened) 🙂 Below is one of the Win 2012 machine.
The Attack:
Attackers always the scan the whole CIDR to find the services running on the machines in the range. In this example, simulating the scan, I will use only one machine ( the above one) from the Kali VM looking if the RDP (port 3389) is opened.
nmap -p 3389 IPAddress –Pn
For brute-force, we will use crowbar.
Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/galkan/crowbar.git
I have separate files for usernames(userlist) and passwords(passwordlist) which will be used by Crowbar in combination to attempt to login to the above machine via RDP.
python crowbar.py -b rdp -s ipaddress -U userlist -C passwordlist –v
-b indicates target service. In this case Its rdp but crowbar also supports openvpn, sskkey and vnckey.
-v indicates verbose output
You see the combination which has “RDP-SUCCESS” is the right combination of user name and password which was brute-forced for successful login via RDP. Other attempts failed. Of course, I have the right user name and password in the file. 🙂
Azure Sentinel
Now lets get to Azure Sentinel. As noted above, Its a cloud based SIEM.
You can quickly locate “Azure Sentinel” from the search bar.
Sentinel manages all Its data in a log analytics workspace. If you already have one, you can reuse or create a new one.
One of the first thing you notice in Azure Sentinel is a number of in-built Data Connectors available to collect data from different sources. Not only that includes Azure native data sources such as Azure AD, Office 365, Security center to name a few but also third parties like Palo Alto, Cisco ASA, Checkpoint, Fortinet and F5.
Pretty sure the list will only get longer.
For the purpose of this blog post, we will focus on the “Security Events” by clicking on “Configure”.
Select “All events”.
Click on “Download install Agent for Windows Virtual machines”.
Select the Virtual machine where the agent will be installed.
Click “Connect”.
The “Connect” process takes few minutes to complete.
When the machine is shows “Connected” in Azure portal, you will see the Microsoft Monitoring Agent (MMA) service running on the machine which will upload the logs to the Azure sentinel workspace for the subscription.
Start writing some queries
Azure Sentinel uses Kusto Query Language for read-only requests to process data and return results.
In the sentinel workspace, click on “Logs” and use the below query which is basically looking for security events with successful login event (EventId 4624) and unsuccessful login event (EventId 4625) originating from a workstation named “kali”.
Note the highlighted event was the only successful attempt(EventId 4624) and rest were failures (4525).
SecurityEvent
| where (EventID == 4625 or EventID== 4624) and WorkstationName == “kali”
| project TimeGenerated, EventID , WorkstationName,Computer, Account , LogonTypeName , IpAddress
| order by TimeGenerated desc
Creating Alerts
Create an alert for the above use case by clicking “Analytics” > Add
Give a name to the alert, provide a description. and set the severity.
Set the alert query to detect any RDP login failure:
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4625
| project TimeGenerated, WorkstationName,Computer, Account , LogonTypeName , IpAddress
| order by TimeGenerated desc
Set the entity mapping. These properties will be populated from the projected fields in the query above.
Will be very useful information when we build playbooks. As you can see, there are only three properties which could be mapped at this point but more to come.
In this example, Account Name used for the attempted login, the host where It is being tried on and the workstation where It is tried from will be populated.
Playbook
Playbooks in Azure Sentinel are basically Logic apps which is really powerful not only because of the inbuilt templates but also because they can be heavily customized.
Sorry, I just wanted to remind myself again and you, dear reader that logic apps are really powerful. 🙂
Create the logic app:
In the designer, click on “Blank Logic App”
We first need to define the trigger. In this case It would be when the response to an alert is triggered in Azure Sentinel.
Search “Sentinel” in the textbox and you will find the trigger. Click on the trigger and the trigger will be added as a first step.
We will send an email to respective team (e.g. Security Operations) when this event happens. In this case I am sending the email to my Office 365 email address.
You will need an Office 365 tenant(sign up for free trial here) to send email.
In the below example, I already one and connected. If I didn’t, all I had to do is to sign-in with my admin office-365 account and connection would be available to send emails.
As you click through the subject and body, you will be prompted to select the Dynamic contents which will have relevant data in this case.
Cases
When an alert fires, I creates a case and you can execute the relevant playbook for the case.
In this example, we have a alert configured named “rdp-bruce-force attempt-alert”.
Every time that alert fires, I will create a new case with the same name as the alert with a case Id.
We can then execute the relevant playbook on the case. In this example, we will execute the playbook we created before “rdp-bruce-force attempt-alert-playbook”.
In the Sentinel workspace, click on “Cases” to review all the cases and click on the case which got created for the brute-force attempt.
At the bottom the details pane of the case, click on the “View full details”.
Click “View Playbooks”
Click on “Run” for the playbook we want to execute.
Below is the email as a part of the playbook I got with the account names in the security event logs.
Hope this helps! 🙂
Identify Critical Assets in your environment using F5 Load balancer
Posted by Ashish Gupta in F5, Infosec, PowerShell on February 16, 2019
Identifying the servers hosting critical applications in your environment is crucial so that alerts for unusual events on those servers are put on higher priority for your security operations team.
One of the approaches we can take to identify the critical assets is by leveraging the load balancer. This could be a head start to build a mini-CMDB (Configuration Management Database) for assets for your sec ops team.
Below is an over-simplified example of network architecture showing a critical web app named “example.com” web app hosted by 5 servers which are load balanced on F5 (VIP : 172.22.23.11). Out of the 5 servers, only 3 servers are active.
In this example, the goal is to get the active servers behind the VIP.
I wrote a PowerShell script to get all the active servers behind all the active VIPs on the a given load balancer.
Why this approach?
- If the server is hosting an app which is critical, It has to be load balanced.
- If a new server is added to an existing VIP, this script will get it.
- If a server is decommissioned, It would be inactive to the load balancer and therefore the script will ignore it.
If the script is scheduled to run periodically, we will have an up-to-date list of servers which are running critical applications. That list can be integrated with SIEM to prioritize alerts from the those servers.
The script
The PowerShell script makes use of PowerShell cmdlet for F5 which can be downloaded from the below location.
https://devcentral.f5.com/d/microsoft-powershell-with-icontrol?download=true
The downloaded file is a .zip file. You copy to your local folder, unzip it and run .\setupSnapin.ps1 which is unzipped file. You may get an error :
Could not load file or assembly iControlSnapin.dll or one of its dependencies. Operation is not supported. (Exception from HRESULT: 0x8013515
Make sure the “Unblock” is checked from all the files in the unzipped file including “setupSnapin.ps1”
.\setupSnapin.ps1 should work fine now.
Below is the script. You will need to change the F5 IP address and the partition name where the virtual servers reside. The output of the script is saved to a file named “ServerList.csv”
Add-PSSnapIn iControlSnapIn
function GetPoolMembers($poolname,$virtual_server_name_only,$virtual_ip)
{
$poolmembers = $ic.LocalLBPool.get_member_v2(@($poolname))
$test = $poolmembers[0]
write-output($poolname)
write-output ('Backend servers and ports :')
$member_status = $ic.LocalLBPool.get_member_object_status($poolname,$poolmembers)
$node_index = 0
foreach($poolmember in $test)
{
$availability_status = $member_status[0][$node_index].availability_status
if($availability_status -eq "AVAILABILITY_STATUS_GREEN")
{
$ip_address = $poolmember[0].address.replace($active_folder,"").replace("/","")
write-output($ip_address )
$global:server_node_details += $ip_address+","+$virtual_server_name_only + "," + $virtual_ip +"`n"
write-output($global:server_node_details)
}
$node_index = $node_index + 1
}
write-output $global:server_node_details
}
$global:server_node_details = "sep=,"+"`n"
$global:server_node_details += "Server IP,F5 Virtual IP,F5 Virtual Server Name" +"`n"
$connection = Initialize-F5.iControl -Hostname <Your F5 IP Address> -Credentials (Get-Credential)
$ic = Get-F5.iControl
# Set the active folder aka partitions where you know the virtul servers exist
$active_folder = "/YourPartitionName/"
$ic.SystemSession.set_active_folder($active_folder)
# get list of all the virtual servers
$virtual_server_list = $ic.LocalLBVirtualServer.get_list()
$virtual_server_with_server_side_profile = @()
foreach($virtualserver in $virtual_server_list)
{
$object_status = $ic.LocalLBVirtualServer.get_object_status($virtualserver).availability_status
if($object_status -eq "AVAILABILITY_STATUS_GREEN")
{
$virtual_server_name_only = $virtualserver.replace($active_folder,"")
write-output ('Virtual server name ' + $virtualserver)
write-output ($object_status)
$addresses = $ic.LocalLBVirtualServer.get_destination_v2($virtualserver)
write-output($addresses.Length)
$virtual_ip = $addresses[0].address.replace($active_folder,"")
write-output('Virtual IP address : ' + $virtual_ip )
$pool_name = $ic.LocalLBVirtualServer.get_default_pool_name($virtualserver)
GetPoolMembers $pool_name $virtual_ip $virtual_server_name_only
}
}
$global:server_node_details | Out-File -FilePath .\ServerList.csv
The output
The script output has 3 columns for each server in with Its Virtual IP and Virtual server name.
Virtual server name is an identifier for the Virtual IP address on the load balancer. That name provides an indication of what that server is used for. This approach groups servers by their Virtual server name and saves identifying each server for what it is used for.
In the below hypothetical example for the output, servers 172.22.1.1, 172.22.1.2 and 172.22.1.3 running example.com web app.
Compromising a Azure Windows 2008 R2 SP1 VM
Posted by Ashish Gupta in Penetration Testing on July 4, 2018
TL;DR (Too long Didn’t Read)
If you stand up a windows 2008 R2 VM in Azure with a random user name and password, Its very easy to know that user name and depending on the complexity of the chosen password, It may be feasible to brute-force the VM using RDP.
Below is the process we will follow :
1) As a victim, set up the Azure VM and RDP to it
2) As an attacker, determine the user name for the Azure VM.
3) As an attacker, determine the password for the Azure VM.
4) Simple steps to defend against the attack.
As a victim, set up the Azure VM and RDP to it
Log in to the Azure portal and create the VM
Choose Windows 2008 R2 SP1
Machine Name : Test-Machine-1
Username : SomeRandomName
Password: Choose a password.
Resource Group : Select an existing or just create a new one.
Be cheap and select the lowest cost disk from the list.
Select the RDP from the public inbound port
Finally click on the “Create” button to create the VM
Once the VM is created and running (you will see a notification in the portal), you should see the VM in the list with “Running” status.
Click on the “Test-Machine-1” VM entry in the above list and then click on the “Connect” button.
Click on the “Download RDP File” to download the RDP file for the VM.
Open the RDP file for the VM and enter the credential you used while setting up the VM.
and now we are in the VM
As an attacker, determine the user name for the Azure VM
There is a easier way to determine the user name rather than brute-forcing the VM.
If the victim is logged in to the VM, the attacker can use something like rdpy-rdpscreenshot.py which is one of the fantastic binaries in rdppy by Sylvain Peyrefitte (@citronneur) which allows to take the screenshot of the login screen.
See in the below screenshot. It connected to the IP address 40.76.88.172 and saved the screenshot to c:\temp\test_40.76.88.172.jpg.
python rdpy-rdpscreenshot.py -o c:\temp\test_ 40.76.88.172:3389
Here is the file with screenshot of the login screens showing the user name for the machine.
This was possible because Windows 2008 R2 supports Network Level Authentication – which completes the user authentication before you establish a RDP connection and the logon screen appears.
As an attacker, determine the password for the Azure VM
You can use a RDP brute-forcing utility such as Hydra [https://github.com/maaaaz/thc-hydra-windows] to determine the password for the user from a password list.
hydra -C “C:\temp\login-password-list.txt” 40.76.88.172 rdp
Simple steps to defend against the attack
When you set up the VM and setting up the RDP for it, It warns you about RDP will be exposed to the internet.
So, you should limit access to the RDP from your/your organization’s public IP address/CIDR only through the network security group changes for RDP.
VM Settings > Networking> RDP > Source IP addresses/CIDR ranges
Now with the source IP restriction, rdpy-rdpscreenshot.py from a different IP wont be able to reach the VM to take the screenshot of the login screen.
Won the challenge coin! SANS FOR500 – Windows Forensics Analysis
Posted by Ashish Gupta in forensics, Infosec on February 4, 2018
Feel very privileged to be part of that group!
https://twitter.com/robtlee/status/959902237668540416
GCIH Certification
Posted by Ashish Gupta in Infosec on June 9, 2017
Passed GCIH (GIAC Certified Incident Handler).This was a tough one.
F5 iRules : Setting the HttpOnly flag on a HTTP cookie
Posted by Ashish Gupta in iRule on October 24, 2016
HttpOnly flag on a cookie prevents the client side code to access the cookie. More details here.
If you set this flag on the cookie in the HTTP_RESPONSE in the iRule, you get the below error :
when HTTP_RESPONSE {
HTTP::cookie insert name “UserName” value “john.doe” path “/” domain “xyz.com”
HTTP::cookie httponly “UserName” enable
}
Improper version invoked from within “HTTP::cookie httponly “UserName” enable”
If you create a cookie using the insert method the cookie is created with version 0. If you try to change Its version to 1 to avoid the above error, you will get another error.
when HTTP_RESPONSE {
HTTP::cookie insert name “UserName” value “john.doe” path “/” domain “xyz.com”
HTTP::cookie version “UserName” 1
HTTP::cookie httponly “UserName” enable
}
Illegal argument (line x) invoked from within “HTTP::cookie version “UserName” “1”
The right way to add the httponly flag to a cookie is to specify the version while you are inserting it and then set the httponly flag.
when HTTP_RESPONSE {
HTTP::cookie insert name “UserName” value “john.doe” path “/” domain “xyz.com” version 1
HTTP::cookie version “UserName” 1
HTTP::cookie httponly “UserName” enable
}
Testing
If you have a chrome extension like EditThisCookie which can let you view all the cookies for the web app, you can notice the HttpOnly flag checked for the cookie.
With httponly not enabled on the cookie, the cookie can be accessed via the client side script document.cookie
With httponly not enabled on the cookie, the cookie can NOT be accessed via the client side script document.cookie.
PowerShell Transcription and script bulk logging
Posted by Ashish Gupta in PowerShell on September 29, 2016
PowerShell is indeed command prompt on steroids. The dev and IT productivity can be multifolded using PowerShell. Having said that, PowerShell can be used to execute malicious commands on the host machine.
Fortunately, the group policy allows to not only transcribe every PowerShell command on the host machine but also log the WHOLE PowerShell script (every line of it) executed as such or using by other means e.g. using System.Management.Automation to invoke PowerShell commands. The logs then can be ingested into a SIEM for monitoring and alerting.
PowerShell Transcription
Below screenshot shows that If you enable the PowerShell Transcription and specify a log location, any PowerShell command you execute will be transcribed in a file in the specified location.
Script bulk logging
Below screenshot shows If you enable PowerShell script bulk logging, any script you execute will be logged in the event viewer [Application and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > PowerShell > Operational]
Logging for the Powershell script executed using C# (System.Management.Automation)
The below C# code is using System.Management.Automation to execute the PowerShell script. The script was compiled and executed on the host machine. The PowerShell script which got executed from this C# app was logged in the event viewer [Application and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > PowerShell > Operational].
SP-Initiated Single Sign On using SAML 2.0–Architecture and a simple implementation
Posted by Ashish Gupta in Single Sign-ON on August 15, 2016
Identity Provider (idP) : Party which authenticates the user
Service Provider(SP/RP) : Party which provide a resource/service to the user. Also called a relying party.
Below are the high level steps and I will expand on them later in this article :-
- User tries to access a resource on the SP website
- SP saves the requested resource URL, sees there user does not have a session with them. It then sends the user (with a SAMLRequest) back to the idP it trusts to authenticate.
- idP checks if the user has a session with them and If not challenges the user to log in.
- Upon successful login, idP sends the user to the SP with a SAML assertion.
- SP verifies the SAML assertion, creates a session for the user and lets the user access the resource.
[Click on the below image to enlarge]
1. User tries to access a resource on the SP website
This step is simple. User access a link on the SP.
GET http://serviceprovider.com/serviceproviderweb/Folder1/Folder2/Folder3/DeeplyPlacedFile.asp?id=1 HTTP/1.1
Typically each SP website page user accesses directly (e.g. DeeplyPlacedFile.asp) would check If user has an existing session (e.g. has the required valid SP auth cookie), It will let us user stay in the page the SSO flow ends here. If the user does not have an active session next steps (starting from 2) ) below will follow.
Typically, SP website have cookie check in each page via shared lib. In the example below Its an ASP include file which can be used in all the ASP pages within the SP website.
Note the line :-
Response.Redirect “https://federationengine.serviceprovider.com/sp/startSSO.ping?partnerIdpId=https://federationengine.identityprovider.com&TargetResource=”&url
The above line indicates there is an PingFederate idP connection (with the name ‘https://federationengine.identityprovider.com’) on the service provider federation engine.
This will create a AuthNRequest (SAMLRequest) and will port to the SSO URL on the idp side.
Also note that the the requested Url is also tagged along with the TargetResource querystring. This will make sure the idP Connection would create a relaystate token and will map the same to the requested URL. (more details on this later)
<%
Dim protocol
Dim domainName
Dim fileName
Dim queryString
Dim url
protocol = “http”
If lcase(request.ServerVariables(“HTTPS”))<> “off” Then
protocol = “https”
End If
domainName= Request.ServerVariables(“SERVER_NAME”)
fileName= Request.ServerVariables(“SCRIPT_NAME”)
queryString= Request.ServerVariables(“QUERY_STRING”)
url = protocol & “://” & domainName & fileName & “?” & queryString
cookieValue = Request.Cookies(“ServiceProviderAuthCookie”)
if len(cookieValue) < 1 Then
Response.Redirect “https://federationengine.serviceprovider.com/sp/startSSO.ping?partnerIdpId=https://federationengine.identityprovider.com&TargetResource=”&url
end if
%>
2. SP asks the idP to authenticate the user
If the SP’s federation server determines there is no active session for the user and user is coming for the first time, the federation server constructs an SAML Authentication request also called “SAMLRequest” and sends the base64 version of it to the idP federation server SSO URL.
It also creates an identifier (as a RelayState), saves along with the originally requested URL as a key-value pair. This is done so that when the idP comes with the same identifier, It can retrieve the originally requested URL and can just redirect the user. This way, there is no need of passing the URL around.
If the authentication request is sent via POST, there are the SAMLRequest and RelayState are sent in hidden fields,
SAMLRequest: PHNhbWxwOkF1dGhuUmVxdWVzdCBWZXJzaW9uPSIyLjAiIElEPSJXcWhtdmZVUDQwOXl6
Sm10cGxDbjdSUkVOX3oiIElzc3VlSW5zdGFudD0iMjAxNi0wMy0wNFQwMTowNjoyNy44MDhaIiB4bWxuczpzY
W1scD0idXJuOm9hc2lzOm5hbWVzOnRjOlNBTUw6Mi4wOnByb3RvY29sIj48c2FtbDpJc3N1ZXIgeG1sbnM6c2Ft
bD0idXJuOm9hc2lzOm5hbWVzOnRjOlNBTUw6Mi4wOmFzc2VydGlvbiI+c2FtbDIwLmxwbC5jb208L3NhbWw6SXN
zdWVyPjxzYW1scDpOYW1lSURQb2xpY3kgQWxsb3dDcmVhdGU9InRydWUiLz48L3NhbWxwOkF1dGhuUmVxdWVzdD4=
RelayState: FMCbXM9vrgFI0jT5ZvqC4hieR3JVT4
Below is the Xml representation of the SAMLRequest :-
<samlp:AuthnRequest Version=”2.0″
ID=”WqhmvfUP409yzJmtplCn7RREN_z”
IssueInstant=”2016-03-04T01:06:27.808Z”
xmlns:samlp=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol”>
<saml:Issuer xmlns:saml=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion”>http://www.serviceprovider.com</saml:Issuer>
<samlp:NameIDPolicy AllowCreate=”true” />
</samlp:AuthnRequest>
Notice the highlighted issuer id. This is the entityid of the service provider. This is needed by the identity provider to determine which party It needs to issue the SAMLResponse to.
3. idP checks if the user has a session with them and If not challenges the user to log in
idP Federation server, upon getting the authentication request, initializes the appropriate connection configuration for the service provider (identified by the SP issuer id sent in the previous step). The configured authentication adapter in teh connection is invoked and user is challenged.
4. idP sends SAML assertion to the SP Federation engine
Upon successful user login, the server issues the SAMLResponse. This SAMLResponse is signed with the idP’s private certificate and other attributes needed for the SP to create the session for the user.
If the authentication request is sent via POST, there are the SAMLRequest and RelayState are sent in hidden fields. Notice, Its the RelayState hidden field has the same value SP passed to the idp in step 2).
SAMLResponse: PHNhbWxwOlJlc3BvbnNlIFZlcnNpb249IjIuMCIgSUQ9IldJcHlvTnVrRkdZQ3Q3b0FuQ1JnOHpFUG9V
QiIgSXNzdWVJbnN0YW50PSIyMDE2LTAzLTA0VDAxOjA2OjE2LjczOFoiIEluUmVzcG9uc2VUbz0iV3FobXZ
mVVA0MDl5ekptdHBsQ243UlJFTl96IiB4bWxuczpzYW1scD0idXJuOm9hc2lzOm5hbWVzOnRjOlNBTUw6M
RelayState: FMCbXM9vrgFI0jT5ZvqC4hieR3JVT4
XML respresentation of SAMLResponse below :-
Key points here are :-
a) The issuer id “www.identityprovider.com” is the identity provider’s entity id.
b) The SAML is issued to the entity id “www.serviceprovider.com” of the service provider.
c) SAML is posted to the Assertion Consumer Service (ACS) URL https://www.serviceprovider.com/sp/ACS.saml2 of the service provider.
<samlp:Response Version=”2.0″
ID=”WIpyoNukFGYCt7oAnCRg8zEPoUB”
IssueInstant=”2016-03-04T01:06:16.738Z”
InResponseTo=”WqhmvfUP409yzJmtplCn7RREN_z”
xmlns:samlp=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol”
>
<saml:Issuer xmlns:saml=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion”>www.identityprovider.com</saml:Issuer>
<samlp:Status>
<samlp:StatusCode Value=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success” />
</samlp:Status>
<saml:Assertion ID=”fciE1SgZ2WX-duiqbwBiuvZj9XT”
IssueInstant=”2016-03-04T01:06:17.050Z”
Version=”2.0″
xmlns:saml=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion”
>
<saml:Issuer>www.identityprovider.com</saml:Issuer>
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds=”http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#”>
<ds:SignatureValue>
SM2NhtM3jExOy/RDnCMWc/RKnOfsOs2nr3o9JQMjgdT/g16mcxEA6c+1jRPl8imlhNFk48t6obmN
</ds:SignatureValue>
</ds:Signature>
<saml:Subject>
<saml:NameID Format=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified”>48DEDA35890E4746A134920E70844E6A</saml:NameID>
<saml:SubjectConfirmation Method=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer”>
<saml:SubjectConfirmationData Recipient=”https://www.serviceprovider.com/sp/ACS.saml2″
NotOnOrAfter=”2016-03-04T01:11:17.050Z”
InResponseTo=”WqhmvfUP409yzJmtplCn7RREN_z”
/>
</saml:SubjectConfirmation>
</saml:Subject>
<saml:Conditions NotBefore=”2016-03-04T01:01:17.050Z”
NotOnOrAfter=”2016-03-04T01:11:17.050Z”
>
<saml:AudienceRestriction>
<saml:Audience>www.serviceprovider.com</saml:Audience>
</saml:AudienceRestriction>
</saml:Conditions>
<saml:AuthnStatement SessionIndex=”fciE1SgZ2WX-duiqbwBiuvZj9XT”
AuthnInstant=”2016-03-04T01:06:17.050Z”
>
</saml:AttributeStatement>
</saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>
5. SP federation engine validates the SAML assertion and redirects to SP portal
SP federation engine verifies the signature on the SAML with the publice cert (previously sent offline) and if the verification is successful, creates the session (e.g. via a cookie).
The RelayState token also comes as part of the POST request. It also pulls up the originally requested URL mapped with that token and redirects the user to the the URL.
Changing from TLS v1.0 to TLS v1.2 from a Tomcat Java 7 app
Posted by Ashish Gupta in TLS on July 15, 2016
Apparently if you have a Java 7 app, and if the app connects to a HTTPS endpoint, TLS 1.0 is used by default with a weak cipher suite ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA.
Interestingly, Java 7 does support TLS 1.2 but not enabled by default. So now, If the company managing the HTTPS endpoint decide to disable TLS 1.0 for better security, the client java7 app wont be able to connect to it, because It will use TLS v1.0.
Fortunately, there is a very simple way to make a change from TLS v1.0 to v1.2. Changes below are for a Windows 2012 Tomcat hosted Java 7 app.
1) Stop the Tomcat windows service.
2) Open Tomcat configuration panel (should be listed as “Configure Tomcat” in the start menu).
3) Go to Java tab > Java Options > Add the below lines at the end (screenshot below). Note you may add as many as ciphers as supported by the HTTPS endpoint you are connecting to.
-Dhttps.protocols=TLSv1.2
-Dhttps.cipherSuites=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
4) Start the Tomcat windows service.
By the way, there are a number of supported cipher suites by Java 7 on TLS v1.2.
http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/technotes/guides/security/SunProviders.html#SunJSSEProvider
The supported ciphers can be added as a comma separated list in the cipher suites options.
Dhttps.cipherSuites=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
PingFederate : Include a complex payload in the SAML assertion
Posted by Ashish Gupta in PingFederate on April 22, 2016
Scenario :
You need to send a complex JSON payload in the SAML. The payload would depend upon the contextual data requested through a querystring . Below is the SP connection would look like:-
The input context is in the querystring which is a JSON:-
{“Param1″:”9999″,”Param2″:”8787879″,”Param3″:”Test”}
Above request JSON when passed to a service will give a JSON response like below :-
"data": {
"level1": "some data",
"level2": "some data11",
"level3": {
"level131": "some data 13",
"level132": [{
"level1321": {
"level13211": {
"level132111": "False",
"level132112": "True"
},
"level13212": "some data",
"level13213": "some data"
},
"level1322": "some data"
},
],
"level133": "test data",
"level134": "test data",
}
}
The output needs to be included in the SAML as a value for a SAML attribute. In this case the attribute is named as “Payload”. When we have implemented the solution, below is the part of the SAML response what It would like showing the attribute key “Payload” and the value from the service.
<saml:AttributeStatement>
<saml:Attribute Name="Payload" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:unspecified">
<saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
"data": {
"level1": "some data",
"level2": "some data11",
"level3": {
"level131": "some data 13",
"level132": [{
"level1321": {
"level13211": {
"level132111": "False",
"level132112": "True"
},
"level13212": "some data",
"level13213": "some data"
},
"level1322": "some data"
},
],
"level133": "test data",
"level134": "test data",
}
}
</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
</saml:AttributeStatement>
Now on a first thought one would think this could be done using a custom data-source in PingFederate. However, a custom data-source does not have access to the HTTP request context and therefore cannot access the querystring.
One way to solve this to use an OGNL expression for the “Payload” attribute. The OGNL expression has access to the HttpRequest. So – not only we can get the querystring, but also can get the authentication cookies from the request which may be required by the payload service.
#ServiceURL="http://example.com/payloadservice",
//Get all the cookies
#cookies=#this.get("context.HttpRequest").getObjectValue().getCookies(),
#cookiesMap=new java.util.HashMap(),
#cookies.{ #cookie=#this, #cookiesMap.put(#cookie.getName(),#cookie.getValue()) },
// Get the querystring
#querystring = #this.get("context.HttpRequest").getObjectValue().getQueryString(),
#indexOfPayLoadKey = #querystring.indexOf("&Request_Payload="),
#actualPayload=#querystring.substring(#indexOfPayLoadKey),
// Get the actual payload request
#actualPayload=#actualPayload.replace("&Request_Payload=",""),
/* Via a service call, call the service with the payload request
and get the payload response*/
#restPayloadServiceHelper = new com.pingfederate.utils.payloadservices.RESTPayloadServiceHelper(#ServiceURL),
restPayloadServiceHelper.GetServiceResponsePayload(#actualPayload, #cookiesMap)
Below is the skeleton of the helper class the OGNL expression is using. The jar file for the class needs to be put in the “\pingfederate\server\default\deploy” folder and the PingFederate service needs to be restarted.
/*
The constructor takes the URL.
The method GetServiceResponse takes the payload and also the cookie collection
*/
public class RESTPayloadServiceHelper {
String serviceURL = "";
JSONObject jsonPayloadRequest = null;
public RESTPayloadServiceHelper(String serviceURL)
{
if(serviceURL!= null || serviceURL.length() > 0)
{
this.serviceURL = serviceURL;
}
else
{
throw new IllegalArgumentException(" The supplied service URL " + serviceURL + " is not valid");
}
}
public String GetServiceResponsePayload(String adhocPayloadString, HashMap<String,String> cookieCollection) throws UnknownHostException, IOException
{
// Call the service and return the payload response
}
}
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